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I. INTRODUCTION
The Equal Pay Act provides that, “No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the performance of
which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility.”1
No profession is more suited to equal pay than the job of law professor.2 In terms of “equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility,” we are all required to teach
the same number of courses per semester and we serve on the same
number of committees. While there may be a variance in terms of the
number of articles and books published and where they are placed, that
is often reflected by a separate summer research stipend that rewards
those who publish more. There may be administrative roles that are in
addition to teaching, scholarship, and service roles but that additional
work, too, is typically reflected in an additional administrative stipend.
* Professor of Law and Founding Director, Women, Leadership & Equality Program,
University of Maryland Carey School of Law, J.D. University of Virginia School of Law
(1983), B.A. Yale College (1980). The author would like to thank Susan G. McCarty and Michael Tennison for their research assistance.
1. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012) (quoted in Nicole Buonocore Porter & Jessica R.
Vartanian, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination Cases, 12 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 159, 160 (2011)).
2. Note that my colleague, Professor Deborah Thompson Eisenberg has done excellent work on the fact that in professional positions, the pay gap is larger than in lower-paid,
less professional jobs. The more subjective evaluation process explains some of this and her
article, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 SMU L. REV. 17 (2010), is one of the
most persuasive arguments for reform in this area.
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So the basic professorial salary covers almost exactly the same work.
How, then, did the following situation occur?
The federal commission that investigates discrimination in
the workplace has threatened to sue the University of Denver’s
law school over what the commission calls a “continuing pattern” of paying female professors less than their male colleagues.
In a letter sent to the university on Friday, the director of
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s office in Denver wrote that an EEOC investigation found a gender pay gap
among the school’s legal faculty dating back to at least 1973.
The commission concluded that the university knew about the
gap by 2012, “but took no action to ameliorate this disparity, in
effect intentionally condoning and formalizing a history of wage
disparity based on sex.”
The EEOC’s investigation came after longtime DU law
school professor Lucy Marsh filed a complaint with the commission more than two years ago. Marsh’s attorney on Monday provided a copy of the letter to The Denver Post.
Marsh said the law school could have to pay as much as
$1.2 million in total damages to its female law professors, in addition to paying them salaries going forward equal to what their
male colleagues in similar positions are paid.3
After Professor Marsh filed her complaint with the EEOC in 2013:
The university hired a consultant to evaluate the law
school’s pay structure in 2014. According to the university’s
statement, the consultant concluded there is no evidence that
gender plays a role in setting pay and that pay disparities result
from a combination of a professor’s rank, duties, age and performance scores.
But Melissa Hart, a University of Colorado law professor
who specializes in employment law, said that type of structure
can create exactly the problem the EEOC identified. Federal law
requires a school to take action if its pay structure creates gender inequality, even if the discrimination isn’t intentional, she
said.

3. John Ingold, EEOC Accuses DU Law School of Discriminating Against Women
Professors, DENVER POST, Aug. 31, 2015, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_28735459/eeocaccuses-du-law-school-discriminating-against-women. The article goes on: “In 2012, Marsh,
who has worked at DU’s law school since 1973, was the school’s lowest-paid full professor,
making $109,000 a year. The school’s median salary that year for full professors was
$149,000.” Id.

2016

THE MARKET MYTH AND PAY DISPARITY IN LEGAL
ACADEMIA

869

“That’s what the Equal Pay Act says,” Hart said. “If you see it,
you have to fix it.”4
This wage gap in academia—even when controlling for rank—has
been clearly documented.5 This paper will focus on the affirmative defenses to the Equal Pay Act that play a central role in perpetuating this
pay gap in legal academia. These include exceptions for prior salary,
competing offers, and negotiation. These affirmative defenses fall under
the rubric of “market excuses” and their existence eviscerates the very
law that was meant to make the practice of paying men and women differently illegal.
The paper will describe case law that interprets these affirmative
defenses and applies the analysis in those cases to two recent, highprofile cases in the legal academic workplace. It will describe the current state of play in legal academia in terms of compensation decisions
and the disparate impact that these practices have on women faculty
and possible solutions, including the Paycheck Fairness Act.6
II. THE EQUAL PAY ACT AND MARKET DEFENSES
The Equal Pay Act was enacted in 1963 to remedy pay discrimination based on sex.7 But even if a female professor can make a prima facie
case that her pay is less than that of a similarly situated male professor
who teaches the same number of classes, sits on the same number of
committees, and publishes the same number of articles, the law school
can raise an affirmative defense based on “any other factor other than

4. Id. Professor Hart has written an excellent article on pay disparity in academia
and the Lucy Marsh case in particular, Melissa Hart, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Gender Pay Discrimination in Academia, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 873 (2014). This paper will focus
on how that case and a recent case at the University of Texas School of Law illustrate the
holes in the Equal Pay Act as it applies to female faculty in the legal academy and the norms
used to determine on compensation. It will not address pay discrimination actions under
Title VII which, unlike the Equal Pay Act, is generally construed to require intentional discrimination.
5. MARTHA S. WEST & JOHN W. CURTIS, AM. ASS’N UNIV. PROFESSORS (AAUP),
AAUP
FACULTY
GENDER
EQUITY
INDICATORS
12
(2006),
http://www.aaup.org/NR/rdonlyres/63396944-44BE-4ABA-98155792D93856F1/0/AAUPGenderEquityIndicators2006.pdf. This author has explored pay and
other gender disparities in legal academia in two previous articles, Paula A. Monopoli, Gender and the Crisis in Legal Education: Remaking the Academy in Our Image, 2012 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 1745, and Paula A. Monopoli, In a Different Voice: Lessons from Ledbetter, 34 J.
COLL. & U. L. 555 (2008).
6. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 862, 114th Cong. (2015).
7. Pub. L. No. 98-38, 77 Stat. 56 (1963). See Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at
160 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) providing that “No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees . . . at a rate less than the
rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . for equal work on jobs the
performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility.”).
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sex.”8 The institution can argue that the pay differential is not based on
sex but rather it is based on the market which is allegedly free from bias. Known as the “fourth affirmative defense” in Equal Pay Act cases, a
number of scholars have questioned the assumption that the market is
in fact free from bias and have made an empirical case that using market-based factors like prior salaries and competing offers is infected with
the bias that existed when those prior salaries were set or those competing offers were formulated.9
In their article, Debunking the Market Myth in Pay Discrimination
Cases, Nicole Porter and Jessica Vartanian make the case that the market is not neutral in two ways. First, employers are subject to implicit
bias that causes them “to value male employees more than female employees for reasons unrelated to skill or productivity.”10 A subsequent
employer then uses that “erroneous valuation” to either match the higher salary of an incoming male recruit or when an existing male employee uses a competing offer to ratchet up their existing salary. “Therefore,
prior salaries and outside offers do not represent a “neutral” market system . . . .”11 Second, the same unconscious bias that creates this “erroneous valuation” of women’s worth also affects the way in which employers
react when women respond to an initially low offer with a counteroffer.12
Women are reluctant to negotiate, in part, due to social norms against it
and in part because even when they do, “employers take a much tougher
stance against female employees who negotiate than male employees
who negotiate.13 Accordingly, employers’ reliance on “willingness to negotiate” should not be allowed to justify paying women less than a
man.”14
Porter and Vartanian note that prior salary appears to be the most
frequently deployed market defense.15 For example, in Wernsing v. Department of Human Services:
[T]he plaintiff stated a prima facie case by demonstrating that
she and a male co-worker received disparate starting monthly
8. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(iv). (Once a plaintiff establishes that a pay disparity exists, the burden shifts to the employer to establish that the difference is attributable to a
seniority system, a merit system, a sytem which is based on quantity or quality of production
or that “(iv) a differential was based on any other factor other than sex.” Id.
9. See, e.g., ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER
INEQUALITY: COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY IN AMERICA (1999); Porter & Vartanian,
supra note 1, at 163; see also Sharon Rabin-Marglioth, The Market Defense, 12 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 807 (2010); Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 579 (2001); Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Apporach to Pay Discrimination, 43 ARIZ. STATE L. J. 951 (2011); Deborah Brake, Reviving Paycheck Fairness:
Why and How the Factor-Other-Than-Sex Defense Matters, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 889 (2016).
10. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 164.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 176.
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salaries ($2,478 compared to $3,739) for substantially the same
work. In defense, the Department alleged that the disparity was
justified as a “factor other than sex” because the two employees’
salaries, like all other employees in the Department, were set
pursuant to its company policy to “give lateral entrants a salary
at least equal to what they had been earning” previously. Although the court did not deny the possibility that a prior salary
could be discriminatory, it reasoned that discrimination “is
something to be proved rather than assumed.” Because the
plaintiff failed to even suggest that her or her male colleague’s
prior salary was discriminatory, the court affirmed the lower
court’s grant of summary judgement in the Department’s favor.16
And competing offers have successfully been used as a defense as well.
In Winkes v. Brown University:
[T]he First Circuit upheld the defendant’s decision to match a
competing offer as a valid “factor other than sex.” The case involved art instructors in a two-person department at Brown
University, Rudolf Winkes and Catherine Zerner, both earning
$18,000 a year. When Zerner received a competing offer from
Northwestern University for $25,000, the defendant matched it
in an effort to retain her, increasing Winkes salary to just
$19,500. . . . [T]he court upheld the defendant’s market excuse
despite the finding that such an extensive raise would not have
been offered to a man and testimony from a university chairperson that Winkes and Zerner were equals in virtually every respect other than sex.17
Finally, Porter and Vartanian note that the market defenses include the ability of an employer to use the fact that a male employee
negotiated for more compensation as a defense to paying a male employee who does the same work more than his female counterpart.18 In one
case:
The plaintiff was receiving $7500 annually as a physical education instructor for the defendant. Shortly after hiring the plaintiff, the defendant offered a male physical education instructor
the standard $7500, but the male instructor was unwilling to accept less than $9,000. The court accepted salary negotiation as a
factor other than sex, stating “an employer may consider the
16. Id. at 177 (citing Wernsing v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 427 F.3d 466, 467 (7th
Cir. 2005)).
17. Id. at 177–78 (citing Winkes v. Brown Univ., 747 F.2d 792 (1st Cir. 1984), and
noting that the University had entered into a consent decree to “cure claims of discrimination
under Title VII, a fact that went a long way to persuade the court in finding the defendant’s
actions to retain a valued female instructor reasonable.”).
18. Id. at 178–79 (citing Horner v. Mary Inst., 613 F.2d 706, 714 (8th Cir. 1980)).
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market place value of the skill of a particular individual when
determining his or her salary.”19
Porter and Vartanian note that several lower courts have made
similar determinations and cite a North Dakota District Court case in
which the court, “found that an employer paying a male employee a
higher salary than a female performing the same job does not violate the
EPA where the male demanded more pay during salary negotiation.”20
And the District Court for the District of Maryland, “in a reverse EPA
claim also accepted salary negotiation as a defense to a sex-based wage
disparity saying that the “only difference was that McNierey accepted
the $33,000 while Ms. Inglesh . . . negotiated and received an extra
$2,000.”21 Finally, a similar result obtained in New York where the employer argued the male employee refused to work for less and that was a
factor other than sex.22
III. APPLYING MARKET EXCUSES TO LEGAL ACADEMIA
The definition of merit in academia is highly subjective, based in
large part on the rank of the journal one publishes in and how often one
publishes.23 It also turns on the field one publishes in, with constitu19. Id.
20. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 179 (citing Walter v. KFGO Radio, 518 F.
Supp. 1309, 1318 (D.N.D. 1981)).
21. Id. at 179 (citing McNierney v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 853, 860 (D. Md.
1995)).
22. Id. at 179 (citing McHenry v. One Beacon Ins. Co., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46573
at *36 (E.D.N.Y. 2005)).
23. To the degree that teaching is valued at all, there is also substantial evidence
that teaching evaluations are skewed by gender bias as well. See, e.g., Anne Boring et al.,
Student Evaluations of Teaching (Mostly) Do Not Measure Teaching Effectiveness,
SCIENCEOPEN RES. (Jan. 7, 2016), https://www.scienceopen.com/document/vid?id=0bc459de6f8f-487f-b925-863834a74048. See also Joey Sprague & Kelley Massoni, Student Evaluations
and Gendered Expectations: What We Can’t Count Can Hurt Us, 53 SEX ROLES 779, 791
(2005). The authors write:
Note that students’ memories of their worst-ever teachers appear to be more
emotionally charged than their memories of their best-ever teachers and that the
most hostile words are saved for women teachers. The worst women teachers are
sometimes explicitly indicted for being bad women through the use of words like
bitch and witch. Students may not like their arrogant, boring and disengaged
men teachers, but they may hate their mean, unfair, rigid, cold, and “psychotic”
women teachers. These findings are substantiated by the observations of other
feminist researchers who have reported incidents of student hostility toward
women instructors who are perceived as not properly enacting their gender role
or who present material that challenges gender inequality. . . . That is, women
teachers may be called on to do more of what sociologists call emotional labor, labor that is frequently invisible and uncounted. Thus, if teachers are being held
accountable to, and are attempting to meet, gendered standards, then women
and men may be putting out very different levels of effort to achieve comparable
results. If it takes more for a woman to get a 5 and she nearly kills herself to do
it, that difference in effort will not be measurable on student rating scales.
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tional law at the top of the hierarchy and family law and gender-related
issues at the bottom.24 And pay is often tied to the ability to move laterally, with visiting positions often required, a practice that disproportionately adversely affects women, who are less likely to have spouses
who will follow them.25 Compounding these subjective evaluation processes is that fact that courts have historically been more reluctant to
intervene in higher education discrimination cases, including race and
gender cases, giving even more deference to university and colleges than
other types of employers.26
There have been two high profile cases in legal academia in the
past several years that present useful illustrations of why amending the
“any other factor other than sex” defense with an alternative like “bona
fide factor other than sex, such as education, training or experience” can
make the Equal Pay Act more effective. The first case is that of Professor Lucy Marsh, noted above, of the University of Denver Sturm College
of Law. Marsh was the lowest paid faculty member at the school after
forty years of teaching. The second case involved the release of documents pursuant to a Texas Public Information Act request by faculty
members at the University of Texas School of Law documenting previously undisclosed compensation in the form of six-figure forgivable loans
to certain faculty members, very few of whom were women. A discussion
of the two cases, and how the “any other factor other than sex” defense
is an exception that swallows the rule, illustrates why market excuses
are so pernicious in terms of gender pay disparities in legal academia.
A. The University of Denver Case
In the first case, Professor Lucy Marsh was at a private school that
did not publish faculty salaries.27 In an effort to discover whether female
faculty members were paid less across the board, Professor Marsh became aware that she was in fact the lowest paid faculty member at the
institution.28 She persisted in asking the dean to correct the salary disparity.29 However, in making raises from the pool given by the universi-

Id. at 791 (internal citations omitted).
24. See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of
All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483 (2012) (ranking constitutional law articles among the most
cited of all time).
25. See, e.g., Joan Williams, What Stymies Women’s Academic Careers? It’s Personal, THE CHRON FOR HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 15, 2000, at B10.
26. Barbara A. Lee et al., Implications of Comparable Worth for Academe, 58 J.
HIGHER EDUC. 609, 618–20 (1987).
27. See Melissa Hart, Missing the Forest for the Trees: Gender Pay Discrimination
in Academia, 91 DENV. U. L. REV. 873, 890 (2014) (“[T]he University of Denver is like most
private employers in maintaining secrecy about salaries.”).
28. Professor Lucy Marsh: Attachment to EEOC Intake Questionnaire,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/152792415/EEOC-addendum.
29. Id.
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ty, he stated in a memo that those raises were made without correcting
for gender disparities.30
In her article Missing the Forest for the Trees: Gender Pay Discrimination in Academia, Professor Melissa Hart explores the structures
that contribute to gender pay disparity in academic work and looks
closely at the Lucy Marsh case.31 Hart’s article astutely points out the
recurring strategic “move” of changing the focus from the institution to
the individual in these cases, some of which is driven by the very structure of the statutes themselves.32 After Lucy Marsh decided to file a
complaint with the EEOC, the law school responded by noting that her
performance was “sub-standard”, despite her having received teaching
awards and accolades from the state supreme court for her experiential
teaching.33
But perhaps the most salient fact was that the dean stated in his
memorandum explaining how he had allocated the funds received as
part of a university-wide “Faculty Salary Competitiveness Initiative”:
I want to briefly reference gender-based equity considerations,
as I know that our late colleague Ann Scales had asked about
this issue and others have expressed interest in it as well. In
this round of the Initiative, funds were limited to the top 25 performers without regard to trying to correct potential inequities. .
. . For Full Professors (excluding the former dean), females constitute 32% of the group and receive 30% of the salary dollars,
both before and after this round of raises. The median salary for
female Full Professors was $7,532/year less than that for males
before this round of raises and $11,282/year less than that for
males after this round of raises. The mean salary for female Full
Professors was $14,870/year less than that for males before this
round of raises and $15,859/year less than for males after this
round of raises.34
The dean went on to argue that the figures calculated could not be
understood in a vacuum and that there were three reasons for the differentials including (1) different starting salaries due to variations in
30. Ingold, supra note 3 (quoting Memo from Dean of Univ. of Denver Sch. of Law
to Tenured, Tenure Track, and Long Term Contract Law Faculty (Dec. 13, 2012), “In the
2012 memo, which explained how $1.5 million in raises was awarded that year, [the] law
school dean noted the gender pay disparity but said raises would be given ‘without regard to
trying to correct potential inequities.’ After the raises, female full professors on average
made nearly $16,000 a year less than their male counterparts.”).
31. See Hart, supra note 27.
32. Id. at 877.
33. Ingold, supra note 3 (“In a statement, the law school defended its merit-based
pay structure and blamed Marsh for her lower salary, saying she showed ‘sub-standard performance in scholarship, teaching and service.’”).
34. Memo from Dean of Univ. of Denver Sch. of Law to Tenured, Tenure Track,
and
Long
Term
Contract
Law
Faculty
(Dec.
13,
2012),
http://www.scribd.com/doc/152790023/DU-Faculty-Competitiveness.
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teaching and legal experience “as well as any special circumstances or
deals that may have affected that number,” (2) differences in merit raises over many years and (3) different circumstances in salary histories
including “offers from other schools or lasting salary effects from holding
administrative positions.”35 The dean concludes by offering to do an individual analysis of any one salary and argues that only through such
an analysis can one determine if an inequity exists.36 However, he warns
that “unless I have strong evidence to the contrary, I will need to assume that all of my predecessors’ merit raises were accurate reflections
of performance.”37 Much like Hart notes in her article, the move is toward an individualized rationale and away from systemic gender bias in
pay.
The lack of transparency at a private law school contributed in a
significant way to the female faculty’s difficulty in even being able to
document that pay disparity existed.38 Denver University Law Professor
Ann Scales began the quest for this information.39 Her untimely death
and Lucy Marsh’s admirable decision to continue the work of uncovering
the data was the only way for the disparity to begin to be ameliorated.
That is hardly a way to create an incentive for the law to work without
enforcement and litigation. In addition, the explicit reliance on past
merit decisions illustrates nicely the point Porter and Vartanian make
about past salaries and other compensation decisions not being the
product of a neutral market but rather being infected with gender bias
themselves. Relying on these decisions going forward and being able to
rely on these as a defense to the Equal Pay Act seems an enormous exception that consumes the rule itself. Similarly, the lack of transparency
in pay makes it impossible for women to negotiate equal compensation,
similarly a defense to an EPA claim. This, too, seems like a vast exception to the rule that threatens to make the rule toothless. So how do
women faculty fare when they are at public universities in states that
require public employee compensation be made public each year? As we
shall see, still not so well.
B. The University of Texas Case
Even when a faculty member works at a public institution that requires publication of all faculty salaries, she may still be the victim of
pay disparity. In 2011, a group of faculty members filed a Texas Public
35. Id. at 4.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Hart, supra note 27, at 890 (“Only when the dean of the law school, in an effort to be more transparent, circulated a memo to the faculty identifying a significant difference in median pay for male and female full professors did the possibility of a direct challenge to that disparity become evident.”).
39. Professor Lucy Marsh, Attachment to EEOC Intake Questionnaire,
http://www.scribd.com/doc/152792415/EEOC-addendum.
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Information Act request that revealed the existence of a non-public program, funded by the law school’s Foundation and used to compensate
certain faculty members.40 This additional compensation came largely in
the form of “forgivable loans” that need not be paid back if certain terms
involving length of stay were met.41 The rules in Texas required that
faculty member salaries be published every year since the institution is
a state school.42 These “loans” were not included in the published salaries of the faculty who received them.43 When the loans were made public, the dean justified them on the basis of recruiting star faculty from
around the country and retaining them.44 This would presumably meet
the “any other factor other than sex” market defense under the Equal
Pay Act.45
The December 2014 Report of the Texas Attorney General gives an
inside view of how faculty hiring really works and it is not a system favorable to women.46 Using dominantly masculine terms like “free agent”
to describe the legal hiring market and having a “war chest” to recruit
the “very best faculty,” the former dean who began the program (not the
dean in place when it was revealed) yields a glimpse of a system of faculty hiring suited more to professional baseball than to law schools.47
Allowing such decisions to be essentially exempt from the Equal Pay Act
because of market excuses completely vitiates any real protection for
female faculty. It belies any idea of fair and equal consideration on the
merits.
At Texas, a separate law school foundation raised and managed
funds used for this additional compensation.48 The foundation was
housed in the law school and it shared staff with the law school at one
point in its existence.49 The board deferred to the dean’s view of who
was a valuable faculty member, worthy of paying a premium to recruit
40. Ralph K. M. Haurwitz, AG’s Office Wraps Up Investigation of Forgivable Loans
at UT Law School, STATESMAN (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.statesman.com/news/news/stateregional-govt-politics/ags-office-wraps-up-investigation-of-forgivable-lo/njqR5/ (“Until a 2011
open-records request by three UT law professors, it wasn’t publicly known that about 20 of
their colleagues had received forgivable loans from the Law School Foundation . . . .”).
41. Id.
42. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.022(a)(2) (West 2011) (listing government employee salary as a category of public information).
43. See Haurwitz, supra note 40.
44. Univ. Tex, Report and Recommendations on the Relationship Between the University of Texas at Austin School of Law and the University of Texas Law School Foundation
19
(Oct.
15,
2012),
https://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/FINAL_Report_and_Recommendations_date
d_10-15-2012_2.PDF.
45. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012).
46. OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS GREG ABBOTT, REPORT (2014),
https://www.utsystem.edu/sites/utsfiles/documents/board-regents/attorney-general-report-utaustin-law-school-foundation/report-release-redacted.pdf. [hereinafter Attorney General
Report].
47. Id. at 16.
48. Id. at 4.
49. Id. at 8.
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or retain.50 The faculty budget committee was not told about the
amounts of the additional compensation.51
These forgivable loans were given disproportionately to male faculty.52 One of the few female faculty members who had received such a
loan had to threaten a lawsuit to get one.53 A well-known legal scholar,
she sent a demand letter to the dean stating that the law school was not
in compliance with the Equal Pay Act with regard to her compensation.54 According to the findings of the Attorney General in his Report,
the dean settled the matter.55 The settlement included increased state
compensation and a $250,000 forgivable loan.56
In the wake of the Public Information Act request and the disclosure of the loan program, the president of the university asked the dean
for his resignation citing deep divisions at the law school.57 The local
papers noted that one aspect of the controversy was gender pay disparity: “The resignation comes after three UT law professors made an open
records request for financial information. The records show several sex
discrimination complaints by women and a possible “gender pay gap,”
the Texas Tribune says.”58

50. See Ralph K. M. Haurwitz, UT’s Powers, Law Dean Differ on Circumstances of
$500,000 Loan, STATESMAN, Dec. 14, 2011, http://www.statesman.com/news/news/local/utspowers-law-dean-differ-on-circumstances-of-500/nRh3J/ (“Marilyn Phelan, a former general
counsel for the Texas Tech University System and the outhor of a book on nonprofit organization law, … described the foundation’s role as little more than rubber-stamping the dean’s
recommendations.”).
51. Id. at 22.
52. See
Attorney
General
Report,
Exhibit
C,
http://s3.amazonaws.com/static.texastribune.org/media/documents/Haurwitz_et_al__Redacte
d_Report_for_Release.PDF (listing twenty-one faculty members who received forgivable
loans, only three of whom were female).
53. Attorney General Report at 23.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Haurwitz, supra note 50.
58. Debra Cassens Weiss, UT Law Dean Asked to Resign over ‘Divided Atmosphere’
Caused
by
Faculty
Largesse,
A.B.A.
JOURNAL,
Dec.
9,
2011,
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ut_law_dean_asked_to_resign_over_divided_atmosp
here_caused_by_faculty_large/. The outgoing dean established a Gender Equity Task Force
as one of his last acts that was charged with examining “all tenure and tenure-track faculty
compensation information, including loan agreement information, to determine whether
[the] compensation structure raises gender equity concerns . . . .” Letter from Dean to Colleagues, http://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/Letter_to_My_Colleagues.doc (last
visited April 28, 2016). The dean noted that the Task Force might consider “the temporary
freezing of some group of salaries” as one means of correcting any inequities found. See id.
Note that the current dean says that such loans are no longer given but certain, more modest
funds are still used to recruit and retain faculty. Those amounts are included in the published compensation numbers. Reeve Hamilton & Morgan Smith, UT President Asks Law
School
Dean
to
Resign
Immediately,
TEX.
TRIB.,
Dec.
8,
2011,
http://www.texastribune.org/2011/12/08/dean-ut-law-signs-letter-resignation/; See Haurwitz,
supra note 50.
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The documents released as a result of the Public Information Act
request include a letter from a female professor that illustrates the
problem with not knowing—even in a public system that requires the
information to be published—the total amount of compensation of colleagues due to off-the-books compensation.59 In several meetings with
the dean which she documents in a subsequent letter to him, this professor communicates her view that she was being undercompensated vis
a vis a male colleague. She states that in her first meeting with the dean
about this view, she was asked to take on an additional committee assignment:
Thank you for meeting with me recently to discuss my concerns
about gender equity in pay and institutional governance assignments at the law school in general, and gender-based inequities in my salary in particular. . . .
In our first meeting, . . . I explained to you it is my belief that
my salary is substantially lower than identifiable male faculty
members who perform substantially equal work on jobs requiring equal skill, effort and responsibility, and that there are no
factors other than gender that explain this pay gap. I also reiterated my request that you appoint more women to the Budget
Committee, in light of serious questions about gender pay inequities at the law school and the charge to the Budget Committee
to constitute a gender equity subcommittee. As I said during our
meeting, women are underrepresented on all the major governing committees at UT law school. With respect to the Budget
Committee in particular, I cannot see how a committee comprised of eight men and one woman can put together a credible
gender equity committee.60
The female professor then memorializes what the dean said in response, in terms of historical factors that may have led to the salary gap
and the budget limitations that he was dealing with that did not allow
him to fix it.61 According to her letter, the dean would not share the salaries of other faculty members so they could have an informed discussion of whether there was a gender gap.62 Instead, she notes that he
asked her to do more work by joining the budget committee.63 Already
teaching a heavy load and chairing the time-consuming tenure committee, the professor declined and recommended two other female faculty

59. See Letter from Professor to Dean, Public Information Act disclosure, Open Records
Request,
TEX.
TRIB.
(Oct.
10,
2011),
http://static.texastribune.org/media/documents/ut_law_school_open_records.pdf (hereinafter
Letter from Professor to Dean).
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
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members, both of whom had consistently asked to serve on the budget
committee but had not been appointed.64
What is striking about the letter is that it asserts that the dean
confirmed in a second meeting that at least one male faculty member
made $30,000 more than the female professor for:
[P]erforming substantially equal work on a job requiring equal
skill, effort and responsibility. In fact of course, when you consider teaching load, institutional governance responsibility, and
other measures of contributions to the law school mission, I perform substantially more work each year than that particular
male colleague does. In light of this gender gap, you promised
that you would seek a substantial raise for me during the current salary cycle.65
It is not clear how effective this negotiation, documented in the letter she wrote after the meeting, was, since the salary data released in
the Public Information Act request by faculty did not go beyond the
2010-2011 academic year. The professor received a verbal agreement to
remedy the situation but was also asked to do even more institutional
service work, which she declined.66 This letter illustrates what many
female faculty members already know; even if women do ask for appropriate pay, they are often asked to do more for the same pay.67 And negotiating pay is behavior that is outside acceptable gender norms in our
society, and women are often met with resistance.68
C. Lessons Learned
So what do these two recent cases in academia and the attendant
memoranda and letters that have been made public tell us about how
the Equal Pay Act and its market defenses contribute to the slow progress of women’s full pay equity in legal academia? First, they reveal a
compensation game grounded in an arms race mentality for U.S. News
Rankings as a measure of faculty quality, one replete with competitive
masculine norms. As the Texas dean said to his faculty in an explanatory memorandum:

64. See id.
65. See Letter from Professor to Dean, supra note 59.
66. See id.
67. There is significant empirical data that shows that men are evaluated based on
their future potential (because of gender schemas about competence), and women are judged
only on actual achievements and this letter reflects a variation on that principle—more work
for the same pay. See JOAN C. WILLIAMS & CONSUELA A. PINTO, FAIR MEASURE: TOWARD
EFFECTIVE ATTORNEY EVALUATIONS 19–21 (ABA 2d ed. 2008).
68. Yuki Noguchi, Some Companies Fight Pay Gap by Eliminating Salary Negotiations, NPR (Apr. 23, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/04/23/401468571/some-companies-fightpay-gap-by-eliminating-salary-negotiations.
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Those [aggressive and generous compensation practices at Harvard, Yale and NYU] have become the norm, not the exception,
among top twenty law schools. They are the practices with
which we have had to contend in the course of our faculty building. I cannot speak with confidence of Yale’s fabled offers in the
$500,000 to $600,000 range, but in our own experience, candidates whom we have wished to hire have been offered more than
$400,000 a year, along with other substantial emoluments of the
sort I will describe below.
....
. . . We, too, have frequently included non-salary commitments,
in the form of one-time loans. These have been accompanied
with a promise on our part to defray the costs of repaying the
loan in annual installments of five or seven years, provided that
the recipient of the loan remains on our faculty. . . .
Many of our lateral hires have received such loans. In some cases, I was responding directly to one-time bonus offers by other
schools. In other cases, I was trying to meet generous offers
made on other terms by competing schools. These other terms
included, in addition to a high annual salary, substantial housing assistance, generous college tuition benefits, massive programmatic funds, and the prospect of university professorships. .
..
During the same period, some of our own colleagues came to be
at immediate risk of departure. . . . The loan arrangements [to
existing faculty] were intended to make it attractive for our colleagues and their partners to back away from the brink and renew their commitment to remain members of our community.69
Second, they reveal a lack of transparency even in public law
schools that were by law mandated to reveal salary information. Not
only were the loans at issue in Texas not reflected in published salary
data, for many years they were not revealed to the faculty members on
the budget committee:
Parallel to these events has been the question of the openness of
our compensation commitments to faculty review. When I became Dean, at least three categories of compensation were not
available for review by the Budget Committee: summer research
stipends; most other salary supplements described in various
ways, including “housing” supplements; and the loan arrangements described above. At the outset of my deanship, the Budget
Committee urged me to make information about all aspects of
our compensation available. I declined to do so. I was accus69.

See Letter from Dean to Colleagues, supra note 58, at 1–2.
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tomed to a law school compensation environment typical of almost every elite American law school—an environment in which
faculty members could and did engage with the Dean about
their own compensation packages, but did not know how that
package compared to their colleagues’ compensation. This is true
even in a number of state schools, where the official reported
compensation excludes key compensation arrangements, arrangements most typically associated with large-ticket housing
support.70
If women are not aware that such kinds of additional “salary supplements” are something that is being offered to others, how fair is the
defense that they did not negotiate for them? As noted above, one female
professor in the Texas case sent a demand letter arguing a violation of
the Equal Pay Act.71 So her negotiation was accompanied by threat of
legal action. That kind of litigation is expensive and it takes a terrible
toll.72 This complete lack of transparency and information is fatal to any
effective negotiation, even in the rare case that women ask and are met
with positive result.
Finally, the cases pull the curtain away to expose the practices that
have been used to set faculty pay and additional compensation since
women joined the legal academy in significant numbers. The Denver
dean and the former Texas dean both relied on justifications grounded
in past decisions about merit.73 They illustrate one of the most significant issues identified by scholars who criticize the “other factor other
than sex” defense. It reifies past salary decisions which were themselves
infected with gender bias.74 It is problematic but not atypical that both
deans pointed at these past decisions and then proceeded to suggest that
they had neither the obligation nor the means to correct them. And perhaps legally they did not, if employers who use prior salary as a means
to justify paying male employees more are protected by the “market excuses defense” as it currently exists.

70.
71.
72.

Id. at 4–5.
See Attorney General Report, supra note 46, at 23.
AAUW Educ. Found. & AAUW Legal Advocacy Fund, Tenure Denied: Cases of
Sex
Discrimination
in
Academia
1,
63
(2004),
http://www.case.edu/president/aaction/TenureDenied.pdf [hereinafter AAUW, Tenure Denied].
73. See Ingold, supra note 3; Letter from Dean to Colleagues, supra note 58, at 1-3
(stating that forgivable loans were offered to attract and retain highly-valued faculty members, whose value was presumably determined, in part, on prior merit-based pay decisions).
74. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1.
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IV. SOLUTIONS
A. Legal Solutions
Legal solutions include an amendment to the Equal Pay Act via the
Paycheck Fairness Act which would “replace the current fourth affirmative defense language—“any other factor other than sex”—with “a bona
fide factor other than sex, such as education, training or experience.”75
That Act has languished in Congress, failing to get the support of the
Senate for a number of years. In its current version it would also state
that the “bona fide factor” shall only apply if the employer demonstrates
that such factor satisfied the following: “is not based upon or derived
from a sex-based differential in compensation, is job related with respect
to the position in question’ and is consistent with business necessity.”76
Furthermore, this defense will not apply if the employee can demonstrate that an alternative employment practice exists that would serve
the employer’s business needs without producing the pay differential.”77
In the case of a male faculty member who brings an outside offer to
the dean, this amended language would:
[O]nly allow the use of [an outside offer] if the employer could
demonstrate that the factors were job-related and consistent
with business necessity. Taking the job-related requirement
first, it seems difficult to make an argument that . . . an outside,
competitive offer is job-related. . . . [A]n outside offer if related to
the job of another employer. An employer might try to argue
that an outside competitive offer is job-related if the employee is
threatening to leave his job if the employer does not match the
offer. However, that is not the proper interpretation of jobrelated. The language of the “job-related” and “consistent with
business necessity” requirements is identical to the language of .
. . Title VII.78
Thus, the proper test is whether meeting the male employee’s competitive offer is necessary for its business. If the employer decides that it
is, it can meet the terms of the statute by raising the salaries of female
75. Paycheck Fairness Act, S. 862, 114th Cong. (2015). See also BENJAMIN COLLINS
& JODY FEDERAL, CONG. RES. SERV., RL31867, PAY EQUITY: LEGISLATIVE AND LEGAL
DEVELOPMENTS 9 (2013) (noting that the bill would revise the exception to the prohibition for
a wage rate differential based on any other factor other than sex. It would limit such factors
to bona fide factors, such as education, training, or experience. The bill would state that the
bona fide factor defense shall apply only if the employer demonstrates that such factor: (1) is
not based upon or derived from a sex-based differential in compensation, (2) is job-related
with respect to the position in question, and (3) is consistent with business necessity. Makes
such defense inapplicable where the employee demonstrates that: (1) an alternative employment practice exists that would serve the same business purpose without producing such
differential, and (2) the employer has refused to adopt such alternative practice).
76. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 165.
77. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 165.
78. Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 198.
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employees who are doing similar work.79 If the employer argues that is
too expensive, that “cost defense” should rarely be accepted by courts,
given the clear legislative intent to have employers bear some of the
burden in meeting the goals of the Equal Pay Act.80 In academia, if a
male recruit has neither more years of teaching experience nor an additional degree than a current female faculty member, the Paycheck Fairness Act amendments would require such a result if, after looking at
these bona fide factors other than sex, a university decided to go forward
and hire that male recruit.
In the Texas case, this analysis applied would mean offering similar forgivable loan salary supplements to female faculty who were doing
the same work but who might not be able to solicit competitive offers
due to family considerations that kept them in Austin. At the very least,
it would make the program so expensive that it might have brought it to
an end without a major controversy that brought negative publicity to
the institution, undermining the program’s arguable rationale—
improving the law school’s reputation. This is particularly true in light
of the Sauceda v. University of Texas.81 In her article for this symposium,82 Professor Deborah Brake notes that in Sauceda, “[T]he court rejected “salary compression”—in which the university paid more to attract new hires from an outside university while paying less to existing
faculty members—as a factor other than sex, equating the employer’s
“supply and demand” argument to the kind of stereotyped, sex-based
assumptions embedded in the employment market that Congress sought
to correct through the EPA.”83
In the Denver case, it would have meant adjusting salaries so that
the law school might have been able to argue to the central campus that
the differential in mean/median had to be remedied by law and that the
central campus should provide the funds to do so. If the effort to amend
the Equal Pay Act through the Paycheck Fairness Act described above
were eventually successful, female faculty members “should be able to
make a convincing argument that prior salary and outside offers are not
“job related with respect to the position in question” but rather refer to
former and potential positions.”84 And even without enactment, the provisions of the Paycheck Fairness Act have had an effect on judicial approaches to the factor-other-than-sex defense. Professor Brake notes
that the nascent trend to narrowly construe market defenses, as the
Paycheck Fairness Act would require if enacted, is apparent not only in
Sauceda but also in Drum v. Leeson Electric Company85, in which, “the
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 198–99.
Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 199.
Sauceda v. Univ. of Tex., 958 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Texas 2013).
Brake, supra note 9, at 889
Brake, supra note 9, at 899.
Porter & Vartanian, supra note 1, at 166.
Drum v. Leeson Elec. Co., 565 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 2009).
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Eighth Circuit took a similarly dim view of reliance on market value to
set pay . . . cautioning that courts must take care to ensure that they do
not permit employers to pay women lower wages simply because the
market will bear it. The Dreves court, . . . in granting summary judgment to the employee, was particularly scathing about the employer’s
reliance on the comparator’s negotiation skill to justify his higher pay,
admonishing that a pay disparity is no more justified when it is the result of a single negotiation than when it is the result of a market-wide
phenomenon in a market that differently values the work of men and
women.”86
B. Voluntary Solutions
Even without the Paycheck Fairness Act amendments to the Equal
Pay Act, law school deans can implement voluntary solutions.87 These
include implementing pay transparency, banning negotiation and
matching competitive offers, ignoring prior salaries and using more rigor in setting pay.88 In January 2016, President Obama announced that
by federal rule all companies with more than 100 employees would have
to break down and report pay data by race, ethnicity and gender in an
effort to increase transparency and close the pay gap.89 As we have seen
above, pay transparency may exist at public institutions in academia.
But even then, private donor endowments for chairs and soft money for
program director stipends or additional compensation to secure a hire
from funds other than law school funds, e.g. president and central campus funds, can still make it difficult for female faculty to discover that
they are being paid less for doing exactly the same job.
And deans could ban negotiation in dealing with faculty recruits.
Women tend to negotiate less and get punished more than their male

86. Brake, supra note 9, at 900 (citing Dreves v. Hudson Grp. Retail, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 82636 (D. Vt. 2013) in which, “the Court rejected several factors commonly asserted
under the FOTS defense, prior salary, inducement, and negotiation.”).
87. Note that even if the Paycheck Fairness Act is enacted, it will not be a panacea.
As Professor Deborah Brake notes in her article for this Symposium, “Even if the anythinggoes approach to the FOTS defense were replaced with a job-relatedness and business necessity standard, however, the problem would remain that many courts will never reach the
defense because of the strict approach to the similarity required to make out a prima facie
case of unequal pay for substantially equal work. Doctrinally, increasing judicial scrutiny of
the strength of the employer’s reason will not help clear this hurdle. And yet, shifting the
equal pay claim away from a search for deliberate discriminatory intent may, indirectly, lead
courts to view this threshold issue differently.” Brake, supra note 9, at 910.
88. See Eisenberg, supra note 9.
89. Laura Putre, The Lowdown on Obama’s New Equal Pay Rule, INDUSTRY WEEK
(Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.industryweek.com/labor-employment-policy/lowdown-obamasnew-equal-pay-rule.
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counterparts when they ask for salary increases.90 Moving to a flat offer
would have a significant effect on closing the gender gap.91
Another answer is to ban pay negotiation completely. That is
what Ellen Pao did when she was chief executive of Reddit. The
company established pay ranges based on roles and experience
and gave applicants nonnegotiable offers. “We put the onus on
the company to pay fairly instead of on candidates to negotiate
fair pay,” Ms. Pao wrote in The Hollywood Reporter. . . .92
Deans could also conduct comprehensive reviews of the existing salary
array. Women fare far worse when prior salaries are considered that
already reflect a biased market, either too low for the woman herself or
too high in a colleague coming in as a lateral hire.93 Such studies could
yield important information in salary distortions that were likely the
result of such bias:
If women can lose millions over their careers because they get
job offers based on pay that is already low, one way to stop the
pattern is to ignore their past salaries. Google has said it does
this and instead makes offers based on what a job is worth. In
August, the federal Office of Personnel Management said government hiring managers could no longer rely on an employee’s
previous salary when setting his or her new one. The acting director, Beth Cobert, explained that the practice particularly disadvantaged women who had taken time off to raise children.
Women are also more likely to have worked in the lower-paying
public or nonprofit sectors.” “Don’t ask about salary history for
new hires, and it really reduces the impact of previous discrimination,” Ms. Babcock said. “I think that is the most effective
thing organizations can do.”94
Paying for the job and not the person is the right thing to do in academia. Men and women who are of the same rank should be paid the
same. They teach the same number of credits, have the same publication expectations and do the same committee work. In fact, there is substantial evidence that women actually do more invisible work than men
who hold the same rank in academia.95
90. Margaret A. Neale & Thomas Z. Lys, More Reasons Women Need to Negotiate
Their Salaries, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 29, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/06/more-reasonswomen-need-to-negotiate-their-salaries.
91. Linda Babcock & Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide 1–2 (2003).
92. Claire Cain Miller, How We Can Bridge that Stubborn Pay Gap, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 15, 2016, at BU6 (citation omitted).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Ann C. McGinley, Reproducing Gender on Law School Faculties, 2009 BYU L.
REV. 99, 150–51 (2009) (citing, among other sources, Nancy Levit, Keeping Feminism in Its
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V. CONCLUSION
Legal education is in crisis. The New York Times and the Wall
Street Journal continue their drumbeat that it is overpriced and underperforming in terms of jobs for its graduates.96 That critique has been
refuted by some,97 but it generally resonates with the public and much
of the professoriate itself. The arms race for U.S. News rankings has
had much to do with distorting the functions of the law school itself. The
heart of that enterprise sits in the classroom but the clamor to move up
the rankings, a dominantly masculine form of competing for status within hierarchy, has brought legal education to its knees.
I have argued in the past that the undervaluation of teaching at
the expense of certain kinds of scholarship is linked to that arms race.98
I have also argued that it is connected to the influx of women into the
legal academy in significant numbers and the association of teaching
with feminine norms.99 In this piece, I have argued for amending one of
the major legislative enforcement mechanisms available to remedy pay
discrimination based on gender. I would go one step further and predict
that if the Equal Pay Act market defense were amended, we would see a
healthier, more robust focus on the heart of the law school enterprise—
Place: Sex Segregation and the Domestication of Female Academics, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 775,
777, 786–87 (2001); Kristen Monroe et al., Gender Equality in Academia: Bad News from the
Trenches, and Some Possible Solutions, 6 PERSP. POL. 215, 220, 229–30 (2008)). Id. at 151–52
(“Another study of forty professors (twenty men and twenty women) at four major research
universities found that sixteen of the twenty women (eighty percent of the female subjects),
as opposed to five of nineteen men (twenty-six percent of the males), noted that they had
experienced significant increases in institutional service responsibilities that detracted from
their “scholarly learning.”) (citing Aimee LaPointe Terosky et al., Shattering Plexiglas: Continuing Challenges for Women Professors in Research Universities, in UNFINISHED
AGENDAS: NEW AND CONTINUING GENDER CHALLENGES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 52, 61 (Judith
Glazer-Raymo ed., 2008)).
96. See, e.g., Elizabeth Olson, Study Cites Lower Standards in Law School Admissions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2015, at B1; The Editorial Board, The Law School Debt Crisis,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2015, at SR8; Steven J. Harper, Opinion, Too Many Law Students, Too
Few Legal Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2015, at A15; Elizabeth Olson & David Segal, A Steep
Slide in Law School Enrollment Accelerates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2014, at B3; Jennifer
Smith, U.S. Law School Enrollments Fall, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 2013, at B1; Jennifer Smith,
Law-School Professors Discover Their Jobs Less Secure, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2013, at B1; see
also BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, FAILING LAW SCHOOLS (2012).
97. See Michael Simkovic & Frank McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree,
43 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2014).
98. Monopoli, supra note 5, at 1759–60.
99. Monopoli, supra note 5, at 1759 (“To this day, in American universities teaching
and service is often associated with the feminine and research with the masculine.”) (citing
Shelley M. Park, Research, Teaching, and Service: Why Shouldn’t Women’s Work Count?, 67
J. HIGHER EDUC. 46, 51 (1996)). Monopoli, supra note 5, at 1759 n.86 (“In treating teaching
and service as undifferentiated activities, the argument for prioritizing research utilizes a
technique commonly used to devalue women’s work and, thus, rationalize the unpaid or underpaid status of that work. It assumes that there is no difference between good and bad
teaching (and service) or, that if there is, this difference is unaccounted for by levels of skill,
because these are activities that are instinctual or natural for those who perform them.”)
(quoting Park, supra note 99, at 51).
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the classroom. No one is being given six-figure salary supplements in
legal academia because they have won teaching awards. Such supplements are linked to perceived value of certain kinds of scholarship in the
narrow market of law schools themselves.
The U.S. News distortion of that market is in large part to blame
for this odd world where a degree from one particular law school and
fewer years of practice experience are valued more highly than more
years of such experience when faculty hiring is at stake. And where
scholarship alone has become the singular measure of value in terms of
faculty compensation.100 If we look at whether scholarship alone has
much to do with “performing the job” as the Equal Pay Act requires, I
think the argument is clear that it does not. If we moved away from
such singular measures of value and toward a more holistic approach to
defining what it means to perform the job of a law professor, legal education as a whole would begin its long, slow climb back to health and
students, most faculty members and the public as a whole would be the
beneficiaries. Both women and men in academia should support the
Paycheck Fairness Act amendments as a means to that end.

100. This is not a singular phenomenon of American law schools. Monopoli, supra
note 5, at 1759 n.87 (quoting Park, supra note 99, at 50) (“Why should research be the primary criterion for tenure and promotion? One line of argument, which focuses on research as
an indicator of faculty merit, goes something like this: ‘Research separates the men from the
boys (or the women from the girls). Teaching and service won’t serve this function because
everyone teaches and does committee work.’ A variation on this theme argues that
‘[t]eaching and service won’t serve this function because there is no satisfactory way of evaluating teaching and service.’ According to the first line of reasoning, research performance is
the only factor that differentiates faculty presumed to be equal in other respects. According
to the second line of reasoning, research performance is the only factor by which faculty
members can be objectively evaluated, even if they are unequal in other respects.” (footnote
omitted)). Monopoli, supra note 5, at 1760 n.88 (quoting Park, supra note 99, at 50) (The
author writes: “Current working assumptions regarding (1) what constitutes good research,
teaching, and service and (2) the relative importance of each of these endeavors reflect and
perpetuate masculine values and practices, thus preventing the professional advancement of
female faculty both individually and collectively. A gendered division of labor exists within
(as outside) the contemporary academy wherein research is implicitly deemed “men’s work”
and is explicitly valued, whereas teaching and service are characterized as “women’s work”
and explicitly devalued.”).

